

Multilateral Approaches to Export Control

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**MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL
REGIME
(MTCR)**

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

AN INFORMAL AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION OF COUNTRIES WHICH SHARE THE GOALS OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF UNMANNED DELIVERY SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF DELIVERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

THE MTCR SEEKS TO COORDINATE NATIONAL EXPORT LICENSING EFFORTS AIMED AT PREVENTING PROLIFERATION OF WMD DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

THE MTCR WAS ORIGINALLY ESTABLISHED IN 1987 BY CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES.

(HAPPY 20TH BIRTHDAY TO THE MTCR)

THE NUMBER OF MTCR PARTNERS HAS INCREASED TO A TOTAL OF THIRTY-FOUR COUNTRIES.

THERE ARE FOUR ADHERENTS TO THE MTCR ISRAEL, ROMANIA, THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVAKIA AND INDIA.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

Argentina (1993)

Australia (1990)

Austria (1991)

Belgium (1990)

Bulgaria (2004)

Brazil (1995)

Canada (1987)

Czech Republic (1998)

Denmark (1990)

Finland (1991)

France (1987)

Germany (1987)

Greece (1992)

Hungary (1993)

Iceland (1993)

Ireland (1992)

Italy (1987)

Japan (1987)

Luxembourg (1990)

Netherlands (1990)

New Zealand (1991)

Norway (1990)

Poland (1998)

Portugal (1992)

Republic of Korea (2001)

Russian Federation (1995)

South Africa (1995)

Spain (1990)

Sweden (1991)

Switzerland (1992)

Turkey (1997)

Ukraine (1998)

United Kingdom (1987)

United States of America (1987)

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

- **MTCR FUNCTIONS BASED UPON ADHERENCE TO COMMON EXPORT POLICY GUIDELINES (THE MTCR **GUIDELINES**).**
- **APPLIED TO AN INTEGRAL COMMON LIST OF CONTROLLED ITEMS (THE MTCR **EQUIPMENT, SOFTWARE AND TECHNOLOGY ANNEX**).**
- **THE **GUIDELINES ARE OPEN TO ALL NATIONS TO IMPLEMENT, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE MTCR PARTNERS; WE ENCOURAGE ALL GOVERNMENTS TO UNILATERALLY ADHERE TO THE GUIDELINES.****

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

CATEGORY I RESTRICTS THE TRANSFER OF “MISSILES” – DEFINED AS ROCKET SYSTEMS (INCLUDING BALLISTIC MISSILES, SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES, AND SOUNDING ROCKETS) AND UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) SYSTEMS (INCLUDING CRUISE MISSILES, TARGET DRONES, AND RECONNAISSANCE DRONES) CAPABLE OF DELIVERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) – AND THEIR RELATED EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY.

CATEGORY II ANNEX ITEMS INCLUDE “MISSILES” (AS DEFINED IN CATEGORY I) BELOW THE THRESHOLDS OF 500KG PAYLOAD AND A RANGE EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN 300KM, PROPULSION AND PROPELLANT COMPONENTS, LAUNCH AND GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, VARIOUS OTHER MISSILE-RELATED COMPONENTS, AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY, AS WELL AS CERTAIN OTHER MISSILE SYSTEMS.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

AT THE 2007 PLENARY - COPENHAGEN:

- Partners acknowledged the growing risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In particular, they expressed concern over missile proliferation in Northeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East.
- Partners noted what were then the most recent U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1696 and their direct relevance to MTCR export controls and expressed their determination to implement the calls in these resolutions to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to ballistic missile programmes of proliferation concern.



Nuclear Suppliers Group



Nuclear Suppliers Group

ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BELARUS, BELGIUM, BRAZIL, BULGARIA, CANADA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA, CROATIA, CYPRUS, CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, ESTONIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, IRELAND, ITALY, JAPAN, KAZAKHSTAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SLOVAKIA, SLOVENIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY, UKRAINE, UNITED KINGDOM, and UNITED STATES

The European Commission participates as an observer.



Nuclear Suppliers Group

The aim of the NSG, is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through export controls of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, software and technology, without hindering international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.



Nuclear Suppliers Group

NSG Guidelines (Part 1) governs exports of nuclear materials and equipment which require the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the recipient facility.

NSG Guidelines (Part 2) governs exports of nuclear-related dual-use equipment and materials.



Meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

PLENARY

- Works on the basis of consensus
- Meets once a year.
- Can decide to set up working groups, with recommendations by the Consultative Group, on matters such as the review of the NSG Guidelines, the Annexes, the procedural arrangements, information sharing and transparency activities.
- Can also mandate the Chair to conduct outreach activities with specific countries.



Meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Consultative Group (CG)

- **The NSG's standing intersessional working body, tasked to hold consultations on issues associated with the Guidelines on nuclear supply and the technical annexes.**
- **Takes its decisions by consensus.**



Meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Information Exchange Meeting (IEM)

The IEM immediately precedes the NSG Plenary and provides another opportunity for Participating Governments to share information and developments of relevance to the objectives and content of the NSG Guidelines.



Nuclear Suppliers Group

- A “catch-all” mechanism in the NSG Guidelines, to provide a national legal basis to control the export of nuclear related items that are not on the control lists, when such items are or may be intended for use in connection with a nuclear weapons programme.
- To strengthen the annual information exchange.
- To reinforce the NSG’s contacts with non-partners through seminars and other joint activities with states outside of the NSG.
- To strengthen the relationship between the NSG and the IAEA, including the provision of briefings to the IAEA Director General.



Nuclear Suppliers Group

The past 12 months:

- **The situation regarding Iran's nuclear programme;**
- **Strengthening the NSG Guidelines;**
- **The relationship between the NSG and India;**
- **The DPRK Nuclear test, and;**
- **Transparency and outreach activities.**



Nuclear Suppliers Group

NSG 2006 Plenary, Brasília, Brazil, 1st and 2nd June 2006 Agreed:

- **Revised Guidelines for information sharing within the NSG;**
- **An amendment to the Part 1 Guidelines to include especially designed or prepared valves for use in enrichment plants;**
- **To incorporate the outcomes of the NSG Workshop on sensitive technologies into outreach activities.**



Nuclear Suppliers Group

Participating Governments continue to discuss:

- **The Additional Protocol as a condition of supply;**
- **The issue of Non-Member adherence to NSG Guidelines, seeking to ensure wider implementation of comprehensive and effective control**
- **Further strengthening of the NSG guidelines with respect to enrichment and reprocessing technologies, and**
- **Contacting non-NSG participants in the framework of the NSG outreach programme.**

UN Security Council Resolutions and the Export Control Regimes

Resolution 1718 (2006) - DPRK

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5551st meeting, on 14 October 2006

Resolution 1737 (2006) - Iran

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5612th meeting, on 23 December 2006

UN SCRs and the MTCR/NSG

3. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:

(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document [S/2006/814](#);

(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document [S/2006/814](#), except the supply, sale or transfer of:

(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;

(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;

(c) those set out in document [S/2006/815](#), except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;

THANK YOU